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COMPARATIVE v. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE:
THE EFFECT OF PLAINTIFF'S FAULT

The American judicial system is revolutionizing tort law. Prime
targets of this "judicial activism"' are a number of outdated common law and statutory provisions. Examples are guest statutes,2 the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, 3 privity of contract 4 and classification of plaintiffs as invitees and licensees.' Perhaps the most farreaching change in the common law, however, has been judicial
adoption of comparative negligence, 6 potentially affecting all classes
of tort cases.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has taken an active part in tort
reform, as exemplified by its 1973 adoption of strict tort liability. 7
The most recent examples of the Court's activism are its September
1975 decisions eliminating sovereign immunity8 and the guest
statute 9 as defenses to tort actions. Within the past four years,
however, both the Court' 0 and the state legislature' ' have refused
1. Comment, JudicialActivism in Tort Reform: the Guest Statute Exemplar and a Proposal for qomparativeNegligence, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1566 (1974).
2. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212 (1973); Henry v.
Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1972); Johnson v. Hasset, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.
1974).
3. See, e.g., Nelms v. Laird, 442 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1971); Evans v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971); Flournoy v. School Dist. No. 1, 482 P.2d 966 (Colo.
1971); Krause v. State, 28 Ohio App.2d, 274 N.E.2d 321 (1971); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106
R.I. 562, 107 R.I. 838, 261 A.2d 896 (1970).
4. See, e.g., Mulder v. Parke, Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970),
expanded on rehearing per curiam; 288 Minn. 339, 181 N.W.2d 887 (1970); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); State Stove Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d
113 (Miss. 1966).
5. See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Rowland
v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968); Mile High Fence Co. v.
Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d
528 (1973).
6. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975);
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973). Cf Loui v. Oakley, 50 Hawaii 260, 438 P.3d
393 (1968).
7. Stang v. Hertz, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
8. Hicks v. State, 14 N.M. St. B. Bull. 956 (1975).
9. McGeehan v. Bunch, 540 P.2d 238 (N.M. 1975).
10. Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Products Co., 86 N.M. 235, 522 P.2d 570 (1974). For
previous decisions rejecting adoption of comparative negligence, see Jones v. Pollock, 72
N.M. 315, 383 P.2d 271 (1963); Rose v. Grisolano, 56 N.M. 25, 239 P.2d 719 (1952); Gray
v. Esslinger, 46 N.M. 421, 130 P.2d 24, rehearing denied, 46 N.M. 492, 131 P.2d 981
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to adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence, contrary to the
trend in the majority of American' 2 and foreign 13 jurisdictions. In
light of this trend and the social change it reflects this Comment
urges that New Mexico adopt comparative negligence to replace the
present rules governing the right of recovery of plaintiffs who contributed to their own injuries.
This Comment will focus on three questions: (1) Is comparative
negligence superior in theory and practice to our present system; (2)
Is judicial adoption appropriate; and (3) What system of comparative
negligence would best meet New Mexico's needs?
IS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE SUPERIOR?
Comparative negligence reduces a plaintiffs damages in tort cases
in proportion to the extent of his contributory fault. Contributory
negligence bars any recovery by a plaintiff based on the mere
existence of such fault. In a 1974 decision, Syroid v. Albuquerque
Gravel Products Co.,' ' the New Mexico Supreme Court made it clear
that it would not adopt comparative negligence on the basis of the
shortcomings of contributory negligence alone, absent a clear showing of the former's superiority.' ' Nevertheless, these shortcomings
point up the present need for change in negligence law.
Contributory Negligence: the Need for Change
Contributory negligence bars recovery by a negligent plaintiff,
without regard to the extent of his fault. A plaintiff whose negligence contributes only marginally to his injury recovers the same
amount as one whose negligence is substantial when compared with
that of the defendant: nothing. Very little need be said here concerning the failure of contributory negligence to meet present social
needs.' 6 The doctrine spawns a harshness which, although arguably
(1942). Cf Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 86 N.M. 633, 638-639, 526 P.2d 430
(Ct. App. 1974), suggesting mitigation of damages on stronger proof of plaintiffs negligence.
11. H.B. 187, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (1971). The state legislature previously rejected four
other bills proposing comparative negligence, S.B. 178, 29th Leg., 1st Sess. (1969); H.B.
266, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (1969); H.B. 266, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (1963); S.B. 166, 25th Leg.,
1st Sess. (1961); S.B. 108, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. (1957).
12. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 812, 813, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 864, 532
P.2d 1226, 1232 (1975). For further discussion of adoption by American jurisdictions, see
V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 1.1 (1974); Henry, Why Not Comparative Negligence in Washington?, 14-20 Comparative Negligence Monograph (A.T.L.A., 1970).
13. See Henry, supra note 12, at 9-10.
14. 86 N.M. 235, 522 P.2d 570o(1974).
15. Id. at 238.
16. Numerous articles have been written detailing the failures of contributory negligence
See, e.g., Prosser, ComparativeNegligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465 (1953); Turk, Comparative
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necessary in the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century,1 7 now
lacks a defensible rationale.' 8 Industry no longer needs court protection;' 9 today the courts' "ward" should be the average man.
To mitigate this harshness courts have refused to apply the contributory negligence bar where the defendant engaged in wilful
misconduct, 2 violated a safety statute, 2 ' or where he had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident. 2 2 Underlying each of these
Negligence on the March, 28 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 189 (1950); Haugh, ComparativeNegligence:
A Reform Long Overdue, 49 Ore. L. Rev. 38 (1969).
17. Annotation, ComparativeNegligence, 32 A.L.R.3d 463, 471 (1970) states:
[T] his explanation is based on the idea that economic expansion has required
that the infant industries, especially railroads, be protected from oversympathetic juries who regarded these corporation defendants as intruders, as well
as immensely rich.
18. Turk, supra note 16, at 201-202, described the problem as follows:
In an age when men are pitted against the power and speed of machines
... the harshness of ... [contributory negligence] ... becomes overwhelming. ... The scrambling of pedestrians, motor vehicles, streetcars, railroad
trains and passengers in one pile of mechanized traffic, all in a hurry, presents
an every-day occurrence. All human beings, because of their imperfections, are
what the law would style "negligent" at some time or another.
To call
such a result harsh is to use a mild expression, to say the least.
19. Industry is now protected not only by its size, but also by workmen's compensation
statutes and liability insurance. Note, Illinois Appellate Court Adopts Comparative Negligence Doctrine, 43 Notre Dame Lawyer 422, 424 (1968).
Nevertheless, an argument for continuing protection of industry might be predicated
upon recent economic problems; it should be noted, however, that even at its inception, the
contributory negligence doctrine represented a misapplication of the fault concept to justify
policies of laissez faire capitalism:
The equating of negligence with fault, and fault with morality, has been
mentioned as an influential factor in tort liability ....
The victim whose careless conduct contributed to his own hurt cut himself off from the court's
protection.... Why did the courts penalize the victim so severely and let the
defendant go free? This severity cannot be justified on any basis of morality.
• .. [TI he concept of negligence and the whole array of assumed risk, contributory negligence, proximate cause..., ostensibly based on fault, represent
a flight from morality and are based upon the demands of a revolutionary
environment which captured the minds of judges and the people they
served....
How these defenses and those kindred to them which place the risks of
injury entirely upon the victim and allow the initial wrongdoer to go free is
one of the anomalies of twentieth century tort law. ... Throughout the period
when negligence doctrines were being developed in such profusion the courts
talked endlessly about fault, but what they were doing was freeing enterprise
from liability for the common welfare at the expense of its victims and attempting to justify their harshness toward the victims and their wide departure
from early common law by cloaking their doctrines in terms of morality.
Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, Part I, The Influence of Environment, 64 W.Va. L. Rev. 1,
12-15 (1961). See also Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 954 (1918).
20. Restatement (Second) of Torts § § 481, 482 (1965). See Schwartz, supra note 12, at
§ 5.1; 32 A.L.R.3d, supra note 17, at 491; Prosser, supra note 16, at 470.
21. Restatement, supra note 20, at § 483. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at § 6.1; 32
A.L.R.3d, supra note 17, at 491-492; Prosser, supra note 16, at 470-471.
22. Restatement, supra note 20, at § § 479-480.

174
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exceptions is the theory that it is inequitable to deny a plaintiff
recovery where the defendant is so clearly at fault. It is, however,
equally inequitable to "visit the entire loss caused by the fault of two
parties" 2 3 on the defendant rather than upon the plaintiff. Though
these exceptions mitigate the rule's harshness somewhat, they fail to
address the primary reason for their adoption: courts' recognition
that the contributory negligence doctrine is, in these situations,
patently unfair.
Jury disregard of contributory negligence instructions exemplifies
the doctrine's failure to comport with notions of fairness. Dean
Prosser has commented:
Every trial lawyer is well aware that juries often do in fact allow
recovery in cases of contributory negligence ... [b] ut the process is
at best a haphazard and most unsatisfactory one. 2 4
Toleration of this jury lawlessness threatens public respect for a
system of jurisprudence which condones it. And compromised jury
verdicts indicate forcefully that the stated law no longer comports
with prevalent moral concepts.2 s
Like sovereign immunity, eliminated as a tort defense, 2 6 contributory negligence is doctrinally "archaic," 2 7 and its continuing validity
is at best doubtful.2 8 Its harshness in application has led to several
limitations, which serve only to lessen its harsh results, not to
eliminate them.2 9 The logic which led to discarding sovereign
immunity as a defense applies with full force to the contributory
negligence bar.

23. Prosser, supra note 16, at 469.
24. Id. at 468.
25. See Wade, Comments on Maki v. Frelk, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 938, 944 (1968); James,
Comments on Maki v. Frelk, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 891, 895 (1968). But see Kalven, Comments
on Maki v. Frelk, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 897, 901-904 (1968).
26. Hicks v. State, 14 N.M. St. B. Bull. 956 (1975).
27. Id. at 957.
The original justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity was the
archaic view that "the sovereign can do no wrong." It is hardly necessary for
this court to spend time to refute this feudalistic contention.
28. Id., quoting City of Albuquerque v. Garcia, 84 N.M. 776, 778, 508 P.2d 585, 587
(1973):
As to sovereign immunity, that doctrine, insofar as it has been created by
courts, seems headed for a deserved repose. Courts and scholars can find little
reason for it, and its historical basis is of doubtful validity.
29. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 5-6-18 through 22 (1953), which provides for state or
municipal purchase of liability insurance and concomitant waiver of the sovereign immunity
defense. "... these statutory schemes were in harmony with the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity, but had the effect of lessening, to a certain extent, the oftentimes
harsh results of that doctrine." Hicks v. State, 14 N.M. St. B. Bull. 956, 957 (1975).
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Comparative Negligence: the Logical Alternative
Comparative negligence allows a negligent plaintiff to recover a
portion of the cost of his injury. Although treated somewhat differently under the various forms of the doctrine, 3 0 in general plaintiff's contributory fault is assigned a percentage of the total fault by
the trier of fact. Plaintiff's total damages are then reduced by that
percentage. 3 Thus, a plaintiff whose total damages are determined
to be $1000, and who is deemed by the trier of fact to be 30 per
cent at fault, would recover $700.
The superiority of comparative negligence has been increasingly
recognized by American jurisdictions. 3 2 Two recent court decisions
from respected jurisdictions signal the need for change. In Hoffman
v. Jones,3" decided four days after the answer brief was filed in
Syroid, the Florida Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence.
The Court questioned the continuing validity of contributory negligence3 and added:
Perhaps the best argument in favor of the movement ... is that...
[comparative negligence] ...is simply a more equitable system of
determining liability and a more socially desirable method of loss
distribution.... When the negligence of more than one person contributes to the occurrence of an accident, each should pay the
proportion he has caused the other party. 3 s
After recognizing the trend toward "almost universal adoption of
comparative negligence," ' 3 6 the court concluded:
In the field of tort law, the most equitable result that can ever be
reached by a court is the equation of liability with fault. Comparative negligence does this more completely than contributory negligence, and we would be shirking our duty if we did not adopt the
better doctrine.3 7
30. See text accompanying notes 89-102, infra.
31. Schwartz, supra note 12, at § 2.1.
32. Professor Schwartz observed:
Comparative negligence is truly on the march! In 1950... only five American
jurisdictions applied comparative negligence in one form or another to negligence actions generally.... By April of 1974, comparative negligence will
have replaced contributory negligence in at least twenty-six states and Puerto
Rico. Undoubtedly, comparative negligence will be the prevailing doctrine in
the United States by the end of 1975, and the march of comparative negligence may well have turned into a stampede by the end of the 1970's.
Id. at 1-3.
33. 280 So.2d 431 (Fla., 1973).
34. Id. at 437.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 438.
37. Id.
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California added its name to the list of comparative negligence
states with the 1975 decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.3 8 The California Supreme Court in unequivocal terms declared contributory
negligence to be "inequitable in its operation because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault." 3" Justice Sullivan for
the majority 4 0 emphasized the "theoretical and practical considerations" 4 which have led to the trend toward comparative negligence.
He said:
We are persuaded that logic, practical experience, and fundamental
justice counsel against the retention of ... [contributory negligence] ... it should be replaced in this state by a system under
which liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence
caused4 2it in direct proportion to the extent of their causal responsibility.
Both the Hoffman and Li courts noted that comparative negligence better comports with the central theme of American tort lawliability based on fault. 4 ' But practical considerations, beyond the
theoretical superiority relied upon in those cases, further compel
adoption of the comparative system. Since the system avoids the
all-or-nothing nature of contributory negligence, juries will be able to
follow both the law stated in jury instructions and community concepts of fairness. 4 4 Another potential benefit is a more favorable
public perception of the legal system. 45 The system may also
encourage out-of-court settlements. 4 6 Under the present system,
damage anticipation is complicated by the possibility that a negligent
38. 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 862, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (1975).
39. Id. at 862.
40. Neither dissenting Justice disagreed with the majority opinion regarding the superiority of comparative negligence. Mosk, J. dissented only on the question of retroactive
application of the new rule. Clark, J. dissented on grounds of judicial deferrence to the
legislature. Id. at 1245-47, 119 Cal. Rptr. 877-79.
41. Id. at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
42. Id.
43. Fault-based liability, which developed in America in the late nineteenth century, is
embodied in the principle that wrongdoers should pay for their wrongs. See 0. Holmes, The
Common Law 79-80 (1881); Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev.
537, 539 (1972). See also Green, supra note 19, at 11-14; Isaacs, supra note 19, at 954.
44. See note 25, supra.
45. The United States Supreme Court has long been concerned with public perceptions
of judicial integrity and fairness. See Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
46. An increase in settlements, both prior to and during trial, was reported in a study of
the effect of comparative negligence in the Arkansas court system. Thomson, Comparative
Negligence-A Survey of the Arkansas Experience, 22 Ark. L. Rev. 692 (1969); the
Thomson study confirmed results of a prior study upon which it was based, Rosenberg,
Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 89

(1959).
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defendant may be relieved of any pecuniary liability upon proof of
insubstantial plaintiffs contributory negligence. Under the comparative system, the negligent defendant can at best reduce the amount
he must pay, reducing the attractiveness of litigation. Finally, comparative negligence requires only one general rule of apportionment
to deal with negligence actions. The courts themselves might benefit
most from this.4 1 For example, courts need not place the full
burden on the grossly negligent defendant under a system of comparative negligence. The trier of fact will take the extent of the
defendant's negligence into consideration as a factor in determining
the proportionate fault of the parties.4 8
Opponents of comparative negligence claim that its implementation would be difficult. 4 9 But the experience of jurisdictions applying comparative negligence suggests otherwise. It does not significantly increase the burden of personal injury litigation handled by
the courts.' 0 It does not affect the length of trial or the preference
for jury trials.' 1 It has not demonstrably affected insurance rates., 2
It does not impose an impossible task of apportionment on juries or
courts.' 3
47.
The absolute nature of the contributory negligence defense pushed courts into
arbitrary resolutions when they have been faced with problems such as how to
give fair treatment to a defendant when a plaintiff negligently failed to wear
an available seatbelt or carelessly used a defective product.
Schwartz, Comparative Negligence: Oiling the System, 11 Trial 58, 59 (Jul/Aug. 1975).
48. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at § 5.3.
49. See, e.g., Burrell, Should Illinois Adopt a Comparative Negligence Statute: No!, 51
Ill. Bar J. 195, 206-210 (Nov. 1962). The Illinois Court of Appeals was not impressed by
arguments pertaining to administrative problems. The Court stated:
...were the more desirable rule to result in increased administrative complications, expense or delay, we feel it should be adopted and that suitable steps
should be taken to resolve the resulting procedural problems.
Maki v. Frelk, 85 IU.App.2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284, 290, rev'd 40 Il.2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445
(1967).
50. The Thompson study found that Arkansas attorneys accepted personal injury cases
for plaintiffs whose cases they would have rejected had the contributory negligence bar to
compensation remained in effect. This needed extension of the scope of the law's protection
did not increase courtroom litigation. Rather, the study suggested, the parties received their
day in court out of court, through negotiation and settlement. Thomson, supra note 46, at
713.
51. Id.
52. Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 Mich. L. Rev.
688 (1960).
53.
Here there is empirical evidence and it tends to abate such concerns. Mississippi has functioned well with comparative negligence for over sixty years, and
Wisconsin has weathered any untoward complications for more than forty
years. No state that has adopted comparative negligence has abandoned it and
retreated to the contributory negligence rule. Further, courts in all states have

NEW MEXICO LA WREVIEW

(Vol. 6

The foregoing is not intended to imply, however, that implementation of comparative negligence will be an effortless procedure. Before
the system can work smoothly several questions pertaining to its
application to specific areas must be answered. For convenience of
analysis, these areas have been grouped as follows: (1)the status of
common law exceptions to contributory negligence; (2) the effect of
comparative negligence on other tort doctrines; and (3) other considerations.
Comparative negligence, by avoiding the harshness of contributory
negligence, eliminates the need for court-formulated exceptions to
the latter." Since plaintiff is no longer barred from recovery, the
blameworthiness of defendant's conduct need only be a factor for
jury consideration in assessing proportion of fault. Further, the plaintiffs contributory fault may also be considered, since its effect on
plaintiff's recovery is no longer devastating, and to exclude consideration of it would be inequitable to the defendant. Thus, in Wisconsin, juries may now apportion damages where a defendant is grossly
negligent,'
rather than award full damages to the plaintiff.' 6 The
same result may also be achieved5 ' when plaintiff's conduct, or that
of both the parties, is grossly negligent.5 8 For the same reason, last
clear chance has been abolished by several courts in comparative
negligence jurisdictions.5 9
Comparative negligence remains useful in cases brought under
other tort doctrines. In strict tort liability cases, comparative negligence will provide a more equitable result than the present defenses
been able to apply comparative negligence under the Federal Employers
Liability Act. [footnote omitted].
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 336-337.
54. See Note, Torts: Comparative Negligence + Implied Assumption of the Risk =Injustice, 27 Okla. L. Rev. 549 (1974); Comment, Voluntary Assumption of Risk and the Texas
ComparativeNegligence Statute, 26 Baylor L. Rev. 543 (1974); Comment, The Doctrine of
Last Clear Chance-Should It Survive the Adoption of Comparative Negligence in Texas, 6
Tex. Tech L. Rev. 131 (1974); Schwartz, supra note 12, at Ch. 5, 6, 7, 9; Timmons & Silvis,
Pure Comparative Negligence in Florida:A New Adventure in the Common Law, 28 U.
Miami L. Rev. 737, 757-775 (1974).
55. See, e.g., Schulze v. Kleeber, 10 Wis.2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960); Alsteen v.
Gehl, 21 Wis.2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963).
56. Note that apportionment of damages is unlikely where defendant's conduct is intentional. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at § 5.2.
57. With the exception of some cases in modified comparative negligence jurisdictions.
See discussion, infra.
58. See, e.g., McClellan v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 204 Miss. 432, 37 So.2d 738 (1948); Gulf
& S.I.R. Co. v. Bond, 181 Miss. 254, 179 So.2d 355 (1938).
59. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1974); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 875, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (1975); Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846
(Maine 1968).
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to strict liability based on plaintiff's behavior. 6
One writer has
noted:
The purpose underlying strict products liability would not seem to
be frustrated by a simultaneous application of comparative negligence, [sic] in fact it would seem to be furthered. The manufacturer
would still be held accountable for all harm which his defective
products cause, but the inequitable results of holding the manufacturer liable for that part of the harm caused by the consumer's own
contributory conduct and of totally denying recovery to a consumer
who is held to have "assumed the risk" or "misused the product"
even though he was probably less at fault than the manufacturer,
would be eliminated. The end result would be a much desirable
system in which the only consideration would be what loss was
proximately caused by whose conduct. 6 '
New Mexico presently allows for contribution among joint tortfeasors, 6 2 holding each jointly and severally liable for plaintiff's
damages. 6 3 With the adoption of comparative negligence, it is clear
that comparison of fault must be between that of plaintiff and the
aggregate of multiple defendants, thus preserving joint liability of the
defendants. 6
Retention of several liability raises a more difficult
question. If retained, and the judgment cannot be collected from one
of the joint tortfeasors for some reason, the remaining tortfeasors,
60. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at § 12.2.
61. Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence Defense In A Strict
Products Liability Suit Based on 402A Of The Restatement Of Torts 2D (Can Oil and Water
Mix?), 42 Ins. Couns. J. 39, 52 (1975), suggests two steps which must be taken prior to
application of comparative negligence to these cases:
It must first be recognized that Section 402A is a fault concept and does not
impose absolute liability.... Section 402A's standards must be violated
before liability can be imposed, and it must be proven that the injuries were
proximately caused by this conduct before liability for them is imposed. Thus,
the consumer's own conduct which either contributed to or solely caused the
injury must be taken into account in determining what injuries were proximately caused by the manufacturer's violation of Section 402A's standard.
Secondly, the court ... must be willing to examine ... [the consumer's
contributory conductI ... with the purpose to determine what portion, if
any, of the injury was proximately caused by such conduct. In order to
properly effectuate this goal, the traditional categories of assumption of the
risk, contributory negligence, and misuse must be abandoned and all contributory conduct must be considered under the general heading of contributory
negligence of fault. Once these two steps are taken it becomes an easy task to
apply a comparative negligence rule to strict products liability cases. Id. at
52-53.
See also Corbett, Doctrine of Strict Liability Meets a Comparative Negligence Statute, 17
DePaul L. Rev. 614 (1968).
62. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 24-1-11 to
24-1-18 (1953).
63. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-1-11 (1953).
64. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at § § 16.6-16.8.
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through contribution, must pay more than the amount dictated by
their percentage of fault. Should several liability be eliminated and a
tortfeasor be judgment proof, the plaintiff would recover less than he
should. Regardless of which option is chosen, contribution should be
retained to provide a greater possibility for equitable distribution in
damage apportionment and satisfaction.6
Where two parties, both at fault, seek damages from each other a
setoff procedure would seem particularly appropriate under comparative negligence. Should both be found partially at fault for their
respective injuries, both would be able to plead comparative negligence. To simplify satisfaction of verdicts, the party whose monetary
liability is deemed larger would pay the difference between the
damage awards.6 6 Finally, in all comparative negligence cases the use
of special verdicts reduces the risk of jury misapplication of the
correct standard, especially in complex, multiparty cases. 6 7 By
granting to trial courts broad discretion over the content of special
verdicts,6 S they can be tailored to the requirements of individual
cases.
In summary, comparative negligence seems the superior doctrine
when analyzed in terms of theoretical bases and practical advantages.
Its superiority clearly outweighs any problems of application which
may arise. Any effort which must be expended to perfect a comparative negligence system for New Mexico should be looked upon as a
reasonable price for increased fairness in tort law.
JUDICIAL ADOPTION
Although the Syroid court declined to adopt comparative negligence, it did not foreclose the possibility of subsequent judicial
adoption. 6 9 Judicial adoption poses two questions: (1) Does the
65. The foregoing is intended only as a starting point for discussion. For detailed analysis
of the effect of comparative negligence on other tort doctrines, with suggested solutions, see
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 185-218.
66. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 319-324.
67. The use of special verdicts was recently authorized in Florida. Hoffman v. Jones, 280
So.2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1974). For further discussion of this matter, see Schwartz, supra note
12, at § 17.4.
68. The simplest special verdict requires that the jury answer in writing only two questions: (1) What percentage of total fault is to be attributed to the plaintiff, and (2) What
amount of damages would the plaintiff receive had he not been at fault at all? See Schwartz,
supra note 12, at 282-283.
69.
We do not decide whether this urged replacement should be accomplished by
this Court or by the Legislature, since we decline to repudiate the doctrine of
contributory negligence.
Syroid v. Alb. Gravel Products, 86 N.M.'235, 236, 522 P.2d 570, 571 (1974).
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Court have the power to adopt the proposed system, and (2) Even if
it does, should such action be left to the legislature?
The common law history of contributory negligence provides
guidance for answering the first question. The doctrine originated at
King's Bench in the English courts,7" was later adopted in this
country by American courts, 7 1 and was first applied in New Mexico
by judicial decision. 72 Court-created contributory negligence is subject to court review. 7 This power is clearly demonstrated by the

court-created limitations on the doctrine. 7 4
Judicial power to modify common law rules is limited by subsequent legislative ratification, 7 ' but New Mexico contributory
negligence has not been so ratified. The only New Mexico statutes
relating to contributory negligence eliminate the defense in workmen's compensation cases, 7 6 they do not ratify judicial adoption.
Similarly, ratification should not be inferred from the legislature's
rejection of bills proposing adoption of comparative negligence. 7
70. Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Reprint 926 (1809).
71. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 13 Am. Dec. 464 (1825); Washburn v. Tracy,
2 D. Chip 128 (Vt. 1824). See 32 A.L.R.3d, supra note 17, at § 3.
72. Alexander v. Tennessee & Los Cerillos Gold & Silver Mining Co., 3 N.M. 255, 3 P.
735 (1884). For other cases applying contributory negligence in New Mexico, see Syroid v.
Albuquerque Gravel Products, 86 N.M. 235, 237, 522 P.2d 570, 572 (1974).
73. The Florida Court included in its opinion several considerations which led it to
change a common law rule. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 435-36 (Fla. 1974). They are
not dissimilar to those which are found in Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Products, 86 N.M.
235, 237, 522 P.2d 570, 572 (1974). See also Hicks v. State, 14 N.M. St. B. Bull. 956
(1975).
74. See text accompanying notes 20-22, supra. See, e.g., Thayer v. Denver & Rio Grande
R.R. Co., 21 N.M. 330, 154 P. 691 (1916); Gray v. Esslinger, 46 N.M. 421, 130 P.2d 24,
rehearingdenied 46 N.M. 492, 131 P.2d 981 (1942).
75. The limitation is based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Note
that even this bar to judicial action was circumvented in Hoffman and Li through interpretation of legislative intent.
...it was not the intention of the Legislature... to insulate... [the common
law] ... from further judicial development; rather it was.., to announce and
formulate existing common law principles and definitions for purposes of
orderly and concise presentation and with a distinct view toward continuing
judicial evolution.
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 865, 532 P.2d 1226, 1233 (1975).
76. The Workmen's Compensation Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-5 (1953); The Occupational Disease Disablement Law, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-11-6 (1953); cf Federal Employers
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970); Hicks v. State, 14 N.M. St. B. Bull. 956 (1975).
77. See note 11, supra. Professor James provides an alternate influence:
Juries, which are not caught up in the cross currents of power politics,
probably speak for the community sense of fairness more faithfully than do
legislatures. Consistent jury acceptance of proportional negligence, therefore,
suggests that legislative failure to enact this reform reflects inertia rather than
community sentiment.
Comments on Maki v. Frelk, supra note 25, at 895. See also American Trucking Association,
Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416-417 (1967):
...it is true that the attention of Congress had been called to the need for
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Only two of the bills reached the floor of either chamber for final
passage; both subsequently were killed upon judiciary committee
action of the other chamber. In no instance was a bill debated on the
floors of both houses.
A review of recent decisions in New Mexico and other jurisdictions
fully demonstrates judicial power to change the common law. In

Stang v. Hertz,7 8 the Court adopted a new system for determining
recovery in products liability cases, which eliminated the common
law need for privity of contract. In Flores v. Flores,7 9 a 1973 case
questioning common law interspousal tort immunity the Court said,
"If the common law is not 'applicable to our condition and circum-

stances' it is not to be given effect." 8 0 In Hicks v. State,8 1 the
Court, citing a statement by Justice Cardozo,8 2 described its power
to change the common law in these terms:
Sovereign immunity was born out of the judicial branch of government, and it is the same branch which may dispose of the doctrine.
...We concede that there was ample authority which influenced our
predecessors in adopting and upholding the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. We also say that there is better reasoned authority to
overturn it. We simply conclude that its continuance is causing a
great degree of injustice. 83

Hoffman and Li similarly exemplify that where common law
change is mandated by changing social norms, judicial power to act is
clear,8 4 and courts may be better suited to effect such change than
legislatures.
action . . . [W]e do not regard this (Congressional rejection) as legislative
history...
accordThe Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 780 (1968).
78. 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
79. 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1973).
80. Id. at 603.
81. 14 N.M. St. B. Bull. 956 (1975).
82. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 136-37 (1924),
A rule which in its origins was the creation of the courts themselves, and was
supposed in the making to express the mores of the day, may be abrogated by
the courts when the mores have so changed that perpetuation of the rule
would do injustice to the social conscience.
83. Hicks v. State, 14 N.M. St. B. Bull. 956 (1975). See also Green, The Thrust of Tort
Law, PartII: JudicialLaw Making, 64 W.Va. L. Rev. 115, 140 (1962),
If a court is convinced that justice calls for a pattern of decision different from
some decision made by it or some other court under somewhat similar facts at
a different period of time, it has the responsibility to do justice in the case
before it, and if need be, rectify its formulation of the law. No society could
long endure under law that could not be made to respond to the needs of its
members.
84. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 435 (Fla. 1974) quoting Hargrove v.
Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957),
[T] he courts should be alive to the demands of justice. We can see no neces-
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The court need not wait for legislative action. The legislative
process is complex and time-consuming; any bill is subject to considerations other than the merits of what it proposes." Further,
legislatures which have adopted comparative negligence statutes
often provide no more detailed guidance for their application than the
courts can provide themselves.' 6 Trial court judges have been
considered capable of administering a newly-adopted comparative
negligence system and have been granted broad discretion to handle
problem situations as they arose.' 7
Clearly, the legislature is also an appropriate vehicle to effect the
change. Ideally, the legislature and the judiciary ought to cooperate
in adopting and implementing a workable system.8 8
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE FOR NEW MEXICO

Application of comparative negligence has taken several differing
forms. The two most prominent are the "pure" and "modified"
forms.8 9 Neither form requires that a plaintiff be without fault.
Under both the trier of fact must assign a percentage of fault to each
party. The two systems achieve different results only when the percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff exceeds that assigned to the
defendant.
As its name implies, pure comparative negligence fully implements
the principle of liability based on fault. It provides for reduction of
plaintiff's damages in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to him, even should it exceed the defendant's. The
hypothetical plaintiff who was 30 percent at fault 9 0 recovers $700
sity for insisting on legislative action in a matter the courts themselves
originated.
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 CaL3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 864-871, 508 P.2d 1226,
1282-1239 (1975). For other examples of court-made changes in tort law, see Keeton,
Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 463 (1962).
85. Comment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1566, supra note 1, at 1593; James, supra note 25, at
895; Green, supra note 83, at 117-18.
86. See Schwartz, supra note 12, Appendix B, for a compilation of the various comparative negligence statutes of general application in this country. See also Leflar, Comments on
Maki v. Frelk, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 918, 922-923 (1968).
87. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 439-40 (Fla. 1974); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 73
Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (1975).
88. Note the recent change in composition of the New Mexico Supreme Court, which
voted 3-2 against adoption in Syroid. One of the Justices voting against adoption, Justice
Martinez, has recently retired from the Court. The remaining Justices stood 2-2 on the
question. Should their position remain unchanged, any future proposal for judicial adoption
of comparative negligence will depend on the position of newly-appointed Justice Sosa.
89. The two other forms, termed "equal division" and "slight-gross," have received little
support in this country. For detailed discussions of all four forms, see Schwartz, supra note
12, at 43-82.
90. See text accompanying rule 31, supra.
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of his $1000 damages. Were he found to be 60 percent at fault,
under the pure form his recovery would be $400. Pure comparative
negligence has been employed in Mississippi since 1910," and has
been adopted by statute in Rhode Island 9 2 and Washington. 9 3 It
determines the effect of plaintiff's fault under the Federal Employers
Liability Act, 949 6 and is also the form adopted judicially by Florida 9 s
and California.
Modified comparative negligence, by comparison, apportions
damages in the same way provided plaintiff's fault is found to be less
than a specified portion, usually 50 percent or 51 percent of total
fault. If the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the specified limit, his
claim will be barred, just as under contributory negligence. Its proponents contend that modified comparative negligence better
comports with notions of fairness which deem it unjust to give the
greater wrongdoer a cause of action against the lesser. 9 ' The hypothetical plaintiff who is 30 percent at fault under the modified form
still recovers $700 of his $1000 damages. The result is different
from that derived under the pure form, however, when the plaintiff
is 60 percent at fault. Such a plaintiff does not recover the $400
which the pure form allows him; instead he is barred from any recovery.
The logic which recommends comparative over contributory negligence 9 8 similarly recommends the pure form. It comports better
with the theory underlying tort compensation. If the objective is to
apportion the cost of the accident to the persons who brought it
about by reference to the extent of their fault, there is no valid
justification for discarding that theory when fault exceeds 50 percent. 9 9 The modified form, by setting an upper limit for com91. Miss. Laws, Ch. 135 (1910), as amended, Miss. Laws, Ch. 312 (1920); Miss. Code
Annot. § 11-7-75 (1972).
92. R.I. Gen. Laws Annot. § 9-20-4 (1956).
93. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 4.22.010 (Supp. 1974).
94. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970).
95. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1974).
96. Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975).
97. See Campbell, Recent Developments of Tort Law in Wisconsin 76-77 in Comparative
Negligence Monograph (Schwartz, ed. 1970). Contrary to this assumption, a negligent
plaintiff under pure comparative negligence recovers only that portion of his damages attributable to the defendant.
98. See text accompanying notes 14-68 supra.
99. See Campbell, supra note 97, at 77:
The 50% bar has frequently been supported as a happy compromise which will
pacify both the proponents and the opponents of ... comparative negligence
law. It is, however, a compromise with principle.
Id. Prosser adds:
It appears impossible to justify the rule on any basis except one of pure
political compromise.
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parison, defeats this objective when the plaintiff's fault exceeds the
statutory limit.' 00 In effect, it merely "shifts the lottery aspect of
the contributory negligence rule to a different ground."' 01
Practical considerations also indicate the superiority of the pure
form. Law, by necessity, retains an element of imprecision. Barring
plaintiff's recovery, on the basis of such hairsplitting retains the
harshness which characterizes the contributory negligence system.
Wisconsin's experience demonstrates that there is fertile ground for
appeal when fault hovers near 50 percent.' 02 The pure form avoids
burdening appellate courts with "one percent" cases fostered by the
modified form. Parties are less likely to appeal if the effect would be
only a marginal increase or decrease in damages than if there is a
possibility that liability may be avoided entirely. And the pure form
seems better suited to promoting out of court settlements because
the defendant cannot avoid all liability by virtue of a percentage
point in the jury's verdict. Modified comparative negligence would
retain some of the uncertainty of its predecessor.
Should the parties, however, opt for litigation, the pure form
simplifies the task of the court. It applies one rule which determines
the result whenever more than one party is at fault. By comparison,
Wisconsin, a modified comparative negligence state, found it necessary to discard its modified approach when faced with the problem
of contribution among tortfeasors.' 0 3 The pure form was imported
in such cases.
CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court has previously declared that this
state will follow the lead of other states in tort reform "if the leader
is going in the right direction."' 04 A majority of American jurisdicSupra note 16, at 494. See also Keeton, Comments on Maki v. Frelk, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 906,
911 (1968).
100. Lawyer v. Park Falls, 35 Wis.2d 308, 151 N.W.2d 68 (1967) (Hallowe, C. J., concurring).
101. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242
(1975).
102. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875, 532 P.3d 1226, 1242
(1975).
103. Wisconsin changed from equal division to comparative apportionment amongst
tortfeasors by judicial decision. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962). As
Schwartz points out:
It is important to note in jurisdictions that have comparative negligence legislation similar to Wisconsin's that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has ruled ...
that its "modified" comparative negligence statute has no application to the
doctrine of contribution.
Supra note 12, at 48.
104. Stang v. Hertz, 83 N.M. 730, 735, 497 P.2d 732, 737 (1972).
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tions now compare fault to apportion damages in tort cases. The
history of the doctrine and recent precedent demonstrate that the
leaders are going in the right direction. It is time for New Mexico to
follow that lead.
EDDIE CASTORIA

